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Terrorists’ Use of Tradecraft 
In our current lifestyle there is a heavy reliance in var-
ious forms of electronic communication. For exam-
ple, using mobile phones we can bank or shop online 
while on the go, listen to the radio or watch television, 
keep in touch with friends and colleagues on various 
social media platforms and communicate via email, 
text or on various apps. Less we forget, we can also 
make calls on the mobile phone! The mobile phone is 
in addition to the personal computer, laptop and 
tablet we use to access the various forms of electronic 
communication. Lewis and Callahan’s 2018 study of 
the digital world found that 4.3 billion people use the 
internet, 3.9 billion people use a mobile internet and 
3.4 billion people use various forms of social media. 
 
Their study found that every 60 seconds:  
1. One million people log into Facebook; 
2. 3.7 million Google search enquiries are made; 
3. 4.3 million videos are viewed on YouTube; 
4. 18 million text messages are sent; 
5. 38 million WhatsApp messages are sent; 
6. 187 million emails are sent. 
 
This study did not include Twitter, Instagram, 
Snapchat, Skype and other social media use, but it 
does reveal how widespread global electronic digital 
communication use is. In addition to innocent,          
everyday usage, terrorists and criminals also take ad-
vantage of current methods of electronic communi-
cation and as the figures above reveal the enormity of 
the task facing security service and policing agencies 
in monitoring communication between terrorists. 
This article will provide an illustration of activities that 
amount to tradecraft, mainly those carried out by 
state agencies. This is followed by looking at how ter-
rorists exploit the various electronic communications 
via their own methods of tradecraft, which in essence 
are methods of counter-surveillance techniques. 
 
What is Tradecraft? 
Tradecraft use is not exclusive to terrorists and crim-
inals, it is used by state agencies such as the security 
services and specialist police departments within the 
intelligence community. Tradecraft refers to the tech-
niques, methods and technologies used in modern es-
pionage and generally, as part of the activity of 
intelligence. There is a wide range of tradecraft activ-
ity used by state agencies including:  
1. Agent/Informant Handling – this is where persons 
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already operating within terrorist organisations are 
recruited to pass on intelligence on their peers;  
2. Black Bag Operations – these are covert entries 
into buildings and locations to obtain information on 
targets during human intelligence operation, such as 
placing covert listening devices in rooms and vehicles;  
3. Use of Legends – this where mainly trained state 
agency officers are given a well-prepared and credi-
ble made-up identity with the aim of infiltrating a tar-
get organisation;  
4. Surveillance – this activity includes physical static 
and mobile surveillance operations to surveillance of 
targets’ electronic communications. 
 
Because tradecraft is intrusive into the lives of targets 
(and potentially their family members), state agency 
tradecraft activity is not arbitrary, they are strictly con-
trolled powers granted under statutory authori-
ties/warrants issued either by the judiciary or a 
secretary of state (with subsequent judicial examina-
tion). Factors considered when issuing these author-
ities and warrants are the legal issues of necessity and 
proportionality. Necessity is where due to the cir-
cumstances in which the target is operating, obtaining 
evidence using conventional investigative methods 
are ineffective and these powers are needed. Propor-
tionality is balancing the reasons for the requirement 
of this power with human rights provisions such as 
right to privacy and data protection. The main legis-
lation covering these powers in the UK are the Reg-
ulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 regarding 
use of informants (referred to as covert human in-
formation sources in the Act) and applying static and 
mobile observation. The Investigatory Powers Act 
2016 provides authorisations for various forms of 
surveillance of electronic communications, with other 
powers being granted under terrorism statues intro-
duced from the Terrorism 2000 Act to the Terrorism 
and Border Security Act 2019. In Ireland the Com-
munications (Retention fo Data) Act 2011, the Crim-
inal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009 and Criminal 
Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 provides autho-
risations for state agency tradecraft that is predomi-
nantly carried out by An Garda Siochana (the Irish 
police). 
 
Terrorists’ Counter-Surveillance Tradecraft  
Methods 
Knowing or expecting to be under state agency 
surveillance, terrorists also use tradecraft techniques 
as counter-surveillance methods. In his book, ‘On 
Guerrilla Warfare’, Mao Tse-Tung stated that the 
guerrilla must move among the people as the fish 
swims in the sea and it is the same for the terrorist 
that in order not to bring attention to themselves, 
they must act as normal as possible in their day-to-
day activities. In order to do so, terrorists must be 
conscious of how and what content they communi-
cate or promote using open sources, such as social 
media sites like Twitter, YouTube or Facebook and, 
potentially to be careful in their use of more deeply 
encrypted sites like WhatsApp. 
 
In order to prevent state agencies from monitoring 
their activity there are two distinct methods of trade-
craft deployed by terrorists. Firstly, those active within 
a terrorist group know it is highly likely their move-
ments and use of electronic devices are being moni-
tored by states’ counter-terrorism agencies and 
therefore must be extremely mindful who they asso-
ciate with and how they communicate. Most terrorist 
groups give advice on counter-surveillance tradecraft 
to group members and followers, an example of 
which is the group Islamic State (IS) who in issue 2 of 
their online magazine Rumiyah published an article 
regarding the use of electronic communications. It 
informs its members and followers to be aware of the 
various malware methods adopted by state agencies 
to gain access to electronic communication used by 
the group, along with how to counter the impact of 
the malware. The final piece of advice IS provide is, 
if all else fails return the device to factory settings 
thereby wiping off all communications data. Although 
returning a device to factory settings can frustrate in-
vestigations into terrorist activity, such a move is not 
a total failsafe move as forensic examination can still 
detect images and, albeit broken communication, 
some relevant information related to terrorist activity. 
When this is added to other evidence, it can still pro-
vide an overall pattern of activity revealing terrorists’ 
use of tradecraft.  
Being aware their communications is being moni-
tored, be it far-right, nationalist or Islamist terrorist 
groups, they are now regularly using more deeply en-
crypted sites to communicate through the likes of 
Telegram, GAB (mainly by far-right groups and fol-
lowers) or WhatsApp and darknet sites.  In order to 
attract custom, darknet sites promote a world of com-
plete freedom and anonymity, claiming users can say 
and do what they like uncensored, unregulated and 
outside society’s norms. This has resulted in terrorist 
groups increasingly moving to the darknet to com-
municate. For example, Islamic State use the darknet 
marketplace Silk Road to raise funds, sell books on 
how to carry out jihad, make bombs and homemade 
firearms, as well as purchasing weaponry.  A popular 
darknet site used by terrorists to communicate with 
each other is Tor. Tor is a virtual private network that 
protects the identity of the user by wrapping layers 
around the communication, a process referred to as 
‘onion rooting’. As such, Tor hides the location and 
identity of its users allowing terrorists and extremists 
to have various forums and to communicate relatively 
freely without detection. However, most state agen-
cies, including the UK and Ireland, have malware 
technology to infiltrate and monitor most terrorists’ 
darknet usage.  
The second method of tradecraft deployed by ter-
rorists is in their handling of cleanskins. Cleanskins 
are people who do not have an existing criminal 
record or who have not attracted the attention of po-
lice or security services, or, occasionally, those who 
may be on the periphery of intelligence systems that 
are not regarded as a great risk. As such, cleanskins 
imbued with an extremist ideology are a valuable 
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commodity to terrorist groups. Once directed to a 
more deeply encrypted site, or ideally though clan-
destine meetings, advice is passed onto cleanskins on 
how to apply counter-surveillance tradecraft, includ-
ing how to create a legend to portray what appears to 
be innocent, normal day-to-day activity.  
An example where I provided expert witness evi-
dence on terrorists’ use of tradecraft concerned an in-
dividual who became imbued with the Islamist 
ideology. His electronic footprint and activity over a 
two-year period was submitted at his trial by Eng-
land’s Crown Prosecution Service as evidence for the 
offence of engaging in the preparation of committing 
acts of terrorism under section 5 Terrorism Act 2006. 
After watching online YouTube videos of radical Mus-
lim preachers, he became influenced by the Islamist 
ideology. Following certain terrorist attacks this indi-
vidual emailed/messaged politicians and journalists 
who were critical of Al Qaeda and IS activity. None of 
these messages contained a violent threat, but they 
were extremely critical of violence against Muslims in 
the Middle East by Western states’ military action in 
the region.   
At this stage this individual’s actions are not illegal, 
but it is a pattern that an individual is at a stage of 
being vulnerable of being drawn towards terrorism. If 
such behaviour is exhibited by persons in Britain 
today, especially for staff in specified British authori-
ties (health, education and criminal justice system) 
who have the statutory responsibility under section 
26 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 in hav-
ing due regard to the need to prevent people from 
being drawn into terrorism, this is a stage where in-
dividuals can be referred to agencies involved in the 
Prevent strategy. Even though his extremist be-
haviour was prior to the introduction of the 2015 Act, 
even without the statutory responsibility, the Prevent 
strategy was still in place and he could still have been 
referred to Prevent agencies, but he was not given this 
opportunity  (The Prevent strategy does not apply to 
Northern Ireland). In the autumn of 2015, following 
a visit to his extended family in Bangladesh, his ac-
tions went beyond simply expressing extremist com-
mentary.  
 
In 2016 IS still controlled large areas of Syria and the 
group were actively recruiting foreign fighters, which 
included males from the UK, most of whom travelled 
to Turkey, then onto the Turkish border with Syria. In 
January 2016 this individual planned to travel to 
Syria to join IS, but prior to doing so he created his 
own legend. He booked online a return flight to Is-
tanbul, the e-visa for Turkey and four-night hotel ac-
commodation in Istanbul via his credit card. In 
addition to this he purchased Turkish Lire to the 
amount that would reasonably be expected to cover 
costs of a four-night stay in Istanbul. A few weeks 
prior to his departure he joined an online dating site 
and made connection with a female from Istanbul, 
stating he would meet her on his arrival. Should he be 
challenged by the police prior to his departure, this 
online activity was his cover story for travelling to the 
region.  
On the day of his departure he checked-in at the          
airport and prior to boarding the flight, at the airport 
ATM he withdrew all the money he had in his bank 
account. On arrival at Istanbul he checked into the 
Istanbul hotel, and, as is normal practice, he pre-
sented his credit card to cover any extra hotel costs 
to the reception staff. Evidence revealed that after 
checking in, this individual did not stay at the hotel, 
instead he returned to Ataturk Airport and pur-
chased with cash a single air flight ticket to Gaziantep. 
From there he boarded a bus from Gaziantep to Kilis, 
close to the Turkish/Syrian border. At the border this 
individual was stopped by Turkish border authorities 
who searched his property and found camouflage fa-
tigues, military style boots and a black IS shahada flag.  
As a result, they contacted the UK’s counter-terrorism 
police and sent him back to the UK. On his return he 
was stopped by the police at the airport under Sched-
ule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 who examined the sites he 
was looking at and the communications he made on 
his electronic devices. A sim card linked to a pay-as-
you go mobile phone was also found. He was arrested 
under section 5 Terrorism Act 2006, for the offence of 
engaging in the preparation of committing acts of ter-
rorism. Following his subsequent police interviews 
and forensic examination of his electronic devices it 
revealed the sim card was from a pay-as you-go 
phone used during his time in Bangladesh, and later 
the UK, where he was in communication with IS 
members. It was found that they groomed and in-
structed him in relation to creating a legend prior to 
joining the group as a foreign fighter in Syria. During 
the forensic examination of cell site data that provides 
geographical locations, it revealed the individual’s use 
of his i-phone and the pay-as -you-go phone were in 




In this summary of terrorists’ use of tradecraft, what 
can be provided by expert witnesses who research 
and have practiced in this area is:  
1. Showing patterns of behaviour linked to internet 
and communications use revealing a progression 
from interest in extremist/terrorist sites to becoming 
vulnerable to being drawn towards terrorist activity. 
This is linked to Britain’s Prevent strategy and the 
statutory responsibility of specified authorities under 
section 26 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015;  
2. Identifying methods and rationale behind terror-
ists’ tradecraft through their use of more deeply           
encrypted communications sites;  
3. Identifying and revealing terrorists’ tradecraft in 
their use of internet and electronic communications 
in creating a legend;  
4. Associating investigations into terrorists’ use of          
internet and communications sites with the relevant 
law and practice by state agencies. This includes the 
relevant state statutes granting these agencies powers 
to intercept and carry out surveillance as mentioned 
above, data protection law including the EU’s Direc-
tive on the protection of personal data processed for 
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the purposes of preventing, investigating, detecting 
or prosecuting criminal matters and human rights 
legal provisions such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights and updates in courts’ decisions in in-
terpreting the statutes be it from domestic courts, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union or the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.  
As communication technology advances, so do ter-
rorists use and application of that technology. As such 
a ‘cat and mouse’ game between state agencies inves-
tigating terrorists’ activity develops with continuous 
changes of behaviour and practice by terrorists use of 
electronic communication that investigators must 
monitor, and with-it legislative provisions introduced 
to keep pace with technological advances, ensuring 
that state agencies investigatory methods remain 
within the rule of law. 
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